The interactive plot below examines South Darfur and West Darfur with respect to the proportion of all civilian killings carried out by each type of perpetrator.



ACLED’s 2021 Codebook clarifies that “State Forces” are recognized government function performers, including military and police (pg. 21). It distinguishes “Political Militias” as groups formed for political objectives through violence, aiming to influence governance without overthrowing national power. These militias, often backed by political elites, work with governments or other influential groups for defined goals (pp. 22-23). They may associate with specific identity communities but are distinguished from “identity militias” due to their broader political goals (pg. 23).


As shown in the above visualizations, in almost all cases between 2016 and 2021 in both South Darfur and West Darfur, only state forces, political militias, or identity militias killed civilians.


In 2018, state forces accounted for 38% and 43% of civilian killings in South Darfur and West Darfur respectively, but these figures significantly decreased in the following years. This decline hints at possible growing political will to avoid obvious state-sponsored killings, potentially influenced by the governance changes following the December 2018 to September 2019 revolution. The revolution ousted longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir and established a joint civilian-military transitional government.


However, civilian killings by political militias in South Darfur rose from 33% in 2018 to 57% in 2019, and in West Darfur, they increased from 4% in 2019 to 68% in 2020. A personal examination of the raw data revealed that all of these killings by political militias are coded as having been committed by “Unidentified Armed Group (Sudan)”. I.e., because their identity could not be established they could not be directly linked to either the government or the opposition. Thus, it is at least possible state-led civilian killings may have continued, but were executed by unidentified political militias loyal to the state, enabling state leaders to maintain plausible deniability.


Troublingly, as civilian killings by state forces declined, those by identity militias surged. In South Darfur, identity militia killings rose from 23% in 2019 to 77% in 2020, and in West Darfur, from 50% in 2018 to 85% in 2019. Although this share dropped to 26% in 2020, it dramatically increased to 93% in 2021 with the complete withdrawal of the mission.


The spike in killings by identity militias as UN troops withdrew indicates that the Sudanese government, despite a possible increase in political will to avoid obvious civilian killings, may have lacked the capacity and/or desire to fill emerging power vacuums and prevent such violence.


The second interactive table displays the annual number of civilian killings by perpetrator type, not their proportion. It shows that until 2019, South Darfur had more fatalities from identity militias than West Darfur. However, this trend shifted in 2019 with 39 identity militia killings (up from 15 the previous year) in West Darfur, and dramatically so in 2021 with 144 such killings. The table also indicates a significant decrease in the overall number of killings by state forces, especially in South Darfur after 2018.



Because of the substantial spikes observed in identity militia civilian killings since 2020 in South Darfur and since 2019 in West Darfur, the next two tables examine such killings from both regions. To maintain brevity, the focus of each chart is only on the most lethal identity militia each year within any of the buffers around withdrawn UN bases.


In South Darfur, the first table shows low killings from 2017 to 2019, but a surge in 2020. Of the 73 identity militia killings in all of South Darfur in 2020, 40 (55%) were committed by “Darfur communal militias” within 50 mi of the UN bases closed in 2018. In 2021, of the 38 killings, 14 (37%) were committed by Darfur communal militias near these same bases.


Unfortunately, ACLED does not further disaggregate the “Darfur Communal Militia (Sudan)” category, which would otherwise clarify which specific groups within this militia category were responsible for these killings.


Identity Militias which Killed the Most Civilians near Closed UN Bases in South Darfur
Year Actor Fatalities Attacks Areas
2016 Unidentified Communal Militia (Sudan) 22 9 2017 Closed Base Areas
2017 Abala Ethnic Militia (Sudan) 6 1 2019 Closed Base Areas
2018 Unidentified Communal Militia (Sudan) 7 8 2017 Closed Base Areas
2019 Darfur Communal Militia (Sudan) 6 6 2017 Closed Base Areas
2020 Darfur Communal Militia (Sudan) 40 7 2018 Closed Base Areas
2021 Darfur Communal Militia (Sudan) 14 12 2018 Closed Base Areas


The table for West Darfur below reveals more about the specific identity militias involved in civilian killings than does the table for South Darfur. In 2021, 144 civilian killings by identity militias occurred in all of West Darfur, with 99 (69%) by Rizeigat Arab militias within 50 mi of the 2018-closed UN bases. In 2019, of the 39 civilian killings by identity militias in all of West Darfur, 37 (95%) were by Maaliya Arab militias, also within 50 mi of these same closed bases.


Identity Militias which Killed the Most Civilians near Closed UN Bases in West Darfur
Year Actor Fatalities Attacks Areas
2016 Abala Ethnic Militia (Sudan) 9 1 2018 Closed Base Areas
2017 Unidentified Communal Militia (Chad) 1 1 2017 Closed Base Areas
2018 Zaghawa Ethnic Militia (Chad) 9 1 2018 Closed Base Areas
2019 Maaliya Ethnic Militia (Sudan) 37 7 2018 Closed Base Areas
2020 Darfur Communal Militia (Sudan) 5 6 2018 Closed Base Areas
2021 Rizeigat Ethnic Militia (Sudan) 99 13 2018 Closed Base Areas


In the next 2 tables, I will examine all civilian killings committed by all identity militias in the years and inside the buffers found to be especially deadly in the prior 2 tables: South Darfur in 2020 and 2021 within 50 mi of the UN bases withdrawn from South Darfur in 2018, and West Darfur in 2019 and 2021 within 50 mi of the UN bases withdrawn from West Darfur in 2018.


The area within the buffer around the 2 2018-withdrawn UN bases comprises 26% of South Darfur’s total area (per my calculations). Using this as a benchmark, I will next see whether all identity militia killings falling within the buffer as percentage of all identity militia killings within all of South Darfur, in 2019 and in 2021, are each greater than 26%. If they are, this provides supporting evidence that identity militia killings in the areas near the withdrawn UN bases were disproportionately high in the areas where UN troops likely would have been able to respond to violence or prevent violence had the bases not been withdrawn.


Afterwards, we will turn to West Darfur, taking the same approach as with South Darfur in establishing a benchmark. The area within the buffer around the 2 2018-withdrawn UN bases comprises 58% of West Darfur’s total area (according to my calculations). We will thus see whether all identity militia killings falling within the buffer as a percentage of all identity militia killings within all of West Darfur, in 2019 and in 2021, are each greater than 58%.


Civilian Killings by Identity Militias in South Darfur (2020 and 2021) within 50 Mi of UN Bases Closed in 2018
Year Actor Fatalities Attacks Areas
2020 Darfur Communal Militia (Sudan) 40 6 2018 Closed Base Areas
2020 Fulani Ethnic Militia (Sudan) 28 4 2018 Closed Base Areas
2020 Al-Falata Ethnic Militia (Sudan) 3 1 2018 Closed Base Areas
2020 Total 71
2021 Darfur Communal Militia (Sudan) 14 9 2018 Closed Base Areas
2021 Fulani Ethnic Militia (Sudan) 9 4 2018 Closed Base Areas
2021 Rizeigat Ethnic Militia (Sudan) 2 1 2018 Closed Base Areas
2021 Masalit Ethnic Militia (Sudan) 1 1 2018 Closed Base Areas
2021 Total 26


We can see from the above table that 71 killings (or 97%) of the 73 that occurred in all of South Darfur in 2020 occurred within 50 mi of the bases withdrawn in 2018, as did 26 (or 68%) of the 38 killings in 2021. In both years, these percentages far exceeded the 26% benchmark.


Civilian Killings by Identity Militias in West Darfur (2019 & 2021) within 50 Mi of UN Bases Closed in 2018
Year Actor Fatalities Attacks Areas
2019 Maaliya Ethnic Militia (Sudan) 37 7 2018 Closed Base Areas
2019 Darfur Communal Militia (Sudan) 2 2 2018 Closed Base Areas
2019 Total 39
2021 Rizeigat Ethnic Militia (Sudan) 99 5 2018 Closed Base Areas
2021 Darfur Communal Militia (Sudan) 13 7 2018 Closed Base Areas
2021 Masalit Ethnic Militia (Sudan) 2 1 2018 Closed Base Areas
2021 Total 114


From the above chart, we can see that 39 civilian killings were committed by identity militias in 2019 within 50 mi of the UN bases withdrawn from West Darfur in 2018. This constitutes 100% of all civilian killings committed by identity militias in all of West Darfur in 2019.


We also see that 114 (or 79%) of the 144 civilian killings by identity militias in all of West Darfur in 2021 occurred within 50 mi of the UN bases withdrawn in 2018. Thus, in both 2019 and 2021, the benchmark was far surpassed.


We can see from these charts as well as from prior visuals that the evidence supports the theory that one of the factors which played a role in sharp increases in violence against civilians in Darfur was the withdrawal of UN bases as UNAMID closed. Additionally, we have seen there were opportunities when the UN could have recognized rising levels of violence following base withdrawals and slowed the pace of closing the remaining bases in Darfur, but instead chose not to.