In each of the visuals below, I have created 50 mi radius buffers
around all UN bases that were withdrawn in South Darfur in 2017, 2018,
and 2019. After 2019, no more bases were withdrawn from South Darfur. As
with West Darfur in Visual 7, I have also calculated the total attacks
on civilians and fatalities from such attacks inside these buffers and
plotted them in a heat map table further below for analysis.
Whereas in 2016 (the year before the Edd El Fursan and Tulus UN
bases were closed) there were 47 attacks on civilians and 58 fatalities
within 50 mi of these bases, in 2017 there were 25 attacks on civilians
(a 47% decrease) and 31 fatalities (an 87% decrease).
Looking at the 2017 vs. 2018 maps below, whereas in 2017 (the year
before the Buram and Graida UN compounds were closed) there were 32
attacks on civilians and 28 fatalities within a 50 mi radius of these
bases, in 2018 there were 27 attacks and 28 fatalities - roughly the
same level of violence. A caveat should be noted: it appears from the
map that although troops were withdrawn from the Buram and Graida UN
bases in 2018, there were actually more UN troops within the buffer in
2018 than in 2017. This is likely a result of transfering troops from
the closed bases to other nearby bases that were still active.
Further, while there were 21 attacks on civilians and 22 fatalities
in 2018 within 50 mi radius of the Nyala UN compound before it was shut
down, in 2019 there were only 10 attacks on civilians (a 110% decrease)
and 6 fatalities (a 267% decrease).
We can see that in South Darfur these figures do not lend support to
the theory that the withdrawal of UN compounds led to increasing
patterns of violence against civilians in the immediate term. However, a
similar trend as was seen in Visual 7 in West Darfur repeats itself in
South Darfur with escalating violence years later and higher than usual
fatality per attack rates. Looking at the table below, when attacks on
civilians and fatalities are calculated in future years one can see that
although violence was already prevalent in the area inside these buffers
between the years 2016 and 2018, in the years 2020 and 2021 there was a
noticeable increase in civilian killings beyond usual levels. Further,
the relatively high levels of violence within all 3 buffers between the
years 2016 and 2018 arguably should have raised reservations among UN
officials about withdrawing at the pace they did.
In 2020, within 50 mi of the bases that were closed in 2017, there
were just 12 attacks on civilians but there were 57 fatalities (an 84%
increase compared to 2017), which equates to 4.75 fatalities per attack.
Also in 2020, within 50 mi of the bases closed in 2018, there were only
16 attacks but there were 78 fatalities (a 179% increase compared to
2018), which equates to 4.88 fatalities per attack. Additionally, within
50 mi of the UN compound that closed in 2019, while there were just 10
attacks in 2020, but there were 32 fatalities (a 417% increase compared
to 2019), which equates to 3.10 fatalities per attack. In 2021 in South
Darfur, locations surrounding the UN base withdrawals in 2017 and 2018
had a slight reduction in fatalities per attack, with 1.83 fatalities
per attack and 1.73 fatalities per attack, respectively - still higher
than usual levels. This patterns of higher than normal fatality per
attack ratios is similar to the experience of West Darfur in 2019 and
2021.
In Visual 9, to better understand the causes of the violence against
civilians, and especially in 2019 and 2021 in West Darfur and in 2020
and 2021 in South Darfur, I will examine trends in the types of
perpetrators found resposible for attacks on civilians between
2016-2021.